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Abstract—This paper presents an adaptive steganography 
scheme for Voice over IP (VoIP). Differing from existing stega-
nography techniques for VoIP, this scheme enhances the em-
bedding transparency by taking into account the similarity be-
tween Least Significant Bits (LSBs) and embedded messages. 
Moreover, we introduce the notion of Partial Similarity Value 
(PSV). By properly setting the threshold PSV, we can adaptively 
balance the embedding transparency and capacity. We evaluate 
the effectiveness of this scheme with G.729a as the codec of the 
cover speech in StegTalk, a covert communication system based 
on VoIP. The experimental results demonstrate that our tech-
nique provides better performance than the traditional method. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, steganography has drawn increasing attention. 
Many different steganographic methods for storage media 
(e.g., image [1], audio [2], text [3], etc.) have been proposed in 
the last few years.  However, the area of steganography for 
real-time systems is largely unexplored. In part due to the fact 
that the real-time characteristic of real-time systems is a 
double-edged sword. While the real-time nature potentially 
offers better security for secret messages by virtue of its in-
stantaneity, it does not allow many complex operations, which 
increases the difficulty in assuring security. Nevertheless, giv-
en its potential advantages, steganography for real-time sys-
tems may soon become a worthy subject of further studies. In 
this paper, we focus on one of the typical real-time communi-
cation systems, Voice over IP (VoIP), as a possible carrier to 
apply steganography to provide security for secret messages.  
VoIP is a promising technique to enable telephone calls 
via a broadband Internet connection. Owing to its advantages 
of low cost and advanced flexible digital features, VoIP has 
become a popular alternative to the public-switched telephone 
network (PSTN), and extensive research on it has been con-
ducted [4]. The main motivations for our VoIP-based stegano-
graphy study are twofold. First, the ongoing conversation of 
VoIP can offer an ideal camouflage for secret messages, be-
cause the voice data is naturally assumed to be the only data 
carried in a given VoIP channel. Second, a typically short 
VoIP connection does not give eavesdroppers a sufficient 
amount of time to detect possible abnormity due to hidden 
messages. Recently, some researchers have noticed the advan-
tages of and carried out useful studies on steganography over 
VoIP [5-9]. However, all of these studies adopt the same sim-
ple embedding strategy, replacing the least significant bits 
(LSBs) of the cover speech with the binary bits of secret mes-
sages or their encrypted form without leveraging the characte-
ristics of LSBs. Although LSBs modifications usually have 
little impact on the quality of cover media, blind substitution 
potentially risks being detected by statistic methods. This view 
has been widely accepted by researchers working on stegano-
graphy on storage media [10-12].  In fact, the key criteria for 
steganography are perfect transparency to non-authenticated 
entities and high capacity for carrying secret messages. The 
first criterion, a measure of embedding distortion, is often 
more important. An acknowledged belief is that the smaller 
the embedding distortion, the harder the detection of the em-
bedding changes. Therefore, in this study, we focus on an 
adaptive steganography scheme for VoIP, which aims at mi-
nimizing the distortion of speech quality to enhance the im-
perceptibility of the steganography system. While the pursuit 
of transparency is bound to decrease the capacity, as is well 
known, we are interested in proving an acceptable balance 
between these two criteria. 
To make this paper self-contained, in Section II, we briefly 
summarize the necessary background of VoIP steganography 
and formally define some of the concepts discussed in this 
paper. The proposed adaptive steganography scheme for VoIP 
is described in Section III, which is followed by the evaluation 
of this scheme and its test results that are presented in Section 
IV. The paper is concluded with remarks on the paper’s main 
contribution and future work in Section V. 
II. BACKGROUND AND DEFINITION 
 
Fig.1. The framework of VoIP steganography 
Fig. 1 depicts a general framework of VoIP steganography. 
Let us assume that Alice (the sender) wants to transmit some 
secret messages to Bob (the receiver), while they are talking 
about some inconspicuous topics via the VoIP system. For that, 
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Alice hides some secret messages into the VoIP stream with 
an embedding algorithm; after the voice is sent through the 
VoIP channel, Bob retrieves the secret messages with the cor-
responding restituting algorithm. 
Based on the traditional definition of steganography [13], 
we formally describe VoIP steganography as follows: 
Definition 1 (VoIP Steganography): Given the quadruple 
Ø = <C, M, D, E>, where C is the set of VoIP packet (VoIP 
stream), M is the set of secret messages with |C| ≥  |M|, E: C 
×  M → C represents the embedding function and D: C → M 
represents the restituting function. A system with the property 
that D(E(c, m)) = m for ∀ c ∈C and m ∈M is called a VoIP 
steganography system . 
As in most practical steganography systems, the two 
communication parties in the VoIP steganography system also 
must exchange secret messages without raising any suspicions. 
Therefore, we should guarantee the perceptual similarity be-
tween the cover and the corresponding stego-object (the cover 
embedded with secret message). The authors in [13] defined 
perceptual similarity via a similarity function as follows:  
Definition 2 (Similarity Function): Let C be a non-empty 
set. A function sim: C2 → (- ∞ ,1] is called the similarity 
function on C, for x , y  ∈C, if x = y, sim(x, y) = 1; otherwise, 
sim(x, y) < 1. 
Further, the transparency criterion for steganography can 
be formally described that for ∀ c ∈C and m ∈M maximiz-
ing the value of the following function: 
( , ) ( , ( , )) 1f c m sim c E c m= −                          (1) 
The LSBs substitution has a premise that the modification 
of LSBs is not enough to induce perceptual distortion. How-
ever, the selection of LSBs often largely depends on subjec-
tive opinions. Thus, the potential ineffectiveness of LSBs 
substitution on covers cannot be ignored, especially when em-
ployed in applications with high security requirements. In the 
following text, we will present a novel adaptive steganography 
approach for VoIP, which enhances the embedding transpa-
rency by taking into account the similarity between LSBs and 
embedded messages.  
III. THE ADAPTIVE STEGANOGRAPHY SCHEME FOR VOIP 
Let us consider the following hypothetical case: if the LSB 
stream of the cover speech is exactly the same as the bit 
stream of secret messages to be embedded, the steganography 
has the best transparency without any induced distortion of 
speech quality, i.e. f(c, m) reaches its maximum value 0.  This 
observation suggests that an ideal cover may be obtained if its 
LSBs match perfectly with the binary bits of the secret mes-
sages. However, it is impossible to find such an ideal match 
for most given secret messages, making this approach imprac-
tical. Another possible approach is to only replace the portion 
of LSBs that are equal to the binary bit of secret messages. 
This, however, will inevitably sacrifice the embedding capaci-
ty of the cover speech in favor of good transparency, which 
may not be a significant concern if the cover speech sufficient-
ly long. Unfortunately, the length of the cover speech depends 
on the conversation, which is often short and unpredictable. 
Thus we must strike an acceptable balance between transpa-
rency and capacity. On the other hand, the selection of LSBs 
in this approach cannot be fixed beforehand and may even be 
uncertain, making it very difficult, if not impossible, for the 
receiver to determine which LSBs conceal the secret messages. 
The main idea behind our proposed new steganography ap-
proach, which attempts to strike a good balance between em-
bedding transparency and capacity as detailed next, stems 
from these observations. 
Let us assume that, M = {m1, m2, …, mL} is the bit set of a 
given secret message (it may be encrypted beforehand, which 
is irrelevant in this scheme), where L is the length of the secret 
message; B = {b1, b2, …, bN} is the LSB set of each VoIP 
packet, where, N is the total number of LSBs, and the selec-
tion of LSBs can refer to previous methods [9]. We divide B 
into S parts, namely, B = {B'1, B'2, …, B'S}, where B'i = {b'i1, 
b'i2, …, b'in}, i = 1, 2, …, S; n = N/S; b'ij = b(i – 1) ·n + j, j = 1, 
2, …, n. Accordingly, we divide M into Q parts, i.e. M = {M'1, 
M'2, …, M'Q}, where M'i = {m'i1, m'i2, …, m'in}, i = 1, 2, …, Q; 
Q = L/n; m'ij = m(i – 1) ·n + j, j = 1, 2, …, n. Further, we define the 
following partial similarity function: 
( , ) ( )i iX Y count x yε = =   (2) 
where, X = {x1, x2, …, xT}, Y = {y1, y2, …, yT}, T is the 
length of X and Y, xi, yi = 0 or 1, i = 1, 2, …, T. It means that 
the value of ε(X, Y) is the number of identical bits between X 
and Y. If X and Y are one part of B and M respectively, the 
value of ε(X, Y) is called the Partial Similarity Value (PSV). 
If the threshold PSV is set as η, for ε(X, Y) ≥ η, X can be re-
placed with Y, and for ε(X, Y) < η, X is not changed. This 
process can be formalized as follows:  
, If ( , )
( , )
, If ( , )y
X X Y
X X Y
Y X Y
ε ηϕ ε η
<⎧= = ⎨ ≥⎩     (3) 
Accordingly, function (1) can be converted into: 
( , ) ( , ) 1f X Y X Y Tε= −                             (4) 
For the given threshold PSV η, the condition of replacing 
X with Y is f(X, Y) ≥ η/T – 1.Obviously, if η = T (in this case, T 
= n), the embedding process has the best transparency but the 
smallest capacity; if η = 0, the embedding process can achieve 
the maximum capacity but the minimum transparency. How-
ever, we can adaptively balance the transparency and capacity 
via properly setting the threshold PSV for the given n. Fig. 2 
illustrates this adaptive embedding process.  
 
Fig.2. The adpative embedding process 
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In our scheme, the problem of how to tell the receiver the 
adopted LSBs is tantamount to how to indicate the embedded 
parts in each VoIP packet. Our solution is to set a flag bit for 
each part in every VoIP packet. According to the aforemen-
tioned definition, we need S flag bits, denoted by FB = {fb1, 
fb2, …, fbS}. fbi (i = 1, 2, …, S) can be determined as follows: 
1, If ( , )
0, If ( , )
y
i
y
X Y n
fb
X X n
ε
ε
=⎧⎪= ⎨ =⎪⎩
  (5) 
In the above formula, fbi = 1 indicates that the ith part has 
been replaced, otherwise, the ith part has not been changed. 
Obviously, if we divide B into more parts, we will need more 
flag bits. As far as the number of flag bits is concerned, a 
smaller S is preferable. However, the number of parts can also 
impact the performance of embedding, because the embedding 
transparency and capacity depend on the values of parameters 
n and η. Therefore, choosing a proper S involves a difficult 
tradeoff. In this prototypical scheme, we determine parameter 
S empirically. Another problem is where to place these flag 
bits. In our previous study [13], we present a synchronization 
mechanism using techniques of the protocol steganography, in 
which synchronization patterns are hidden in the unused 
and/or optional fields of the header of a certain packet. In the 
IP header, there are a total of 64 bits that can be used to embed 
messages. Moreover, the headers of upper-level protocols, 
such as UDP, RTP, etc, also have many unused or optional 
fields. Therefore, the sender can distribute the flag bits among 
those fields in a predetermined manner. Because the flag bits 
are often few and altered continually, such a transmission of 
flag bits is potentially hard to discover. The receiver knows 
exactly where the flag bits are embedded. When the receiver 
receives an IP packet, he (she) first checks for every flag bit, 
and then extracts the corresponding hidden parts. After col-
lecting all these parts, the receiver can successfully restitute 
the whole secret message. 
IV. EVALUATION AND TEST 
TABLE I.  STEGANOGRAPHY MODES 
Mode Description 
1 Choosing 8 bits of LSBs in each frame and direct replacing them with secret message bits 
2 Choosing 16 bits of LSBs in each frame and direct replacing them with secret message bits 
3 Choosing 16 bits of LSBs in each frame and adaptive embed-ding secret message bits with n = 4, η = 2. 
4 Choosing 16 bits of LSBs in each frame and adaptive embed-ding secret message bits with n = 4, η = 3. 
5 Choosing 16 bits of LSBs in each frame and adaptive embed-ding secret message bits with n = 4, η = 4. 
We evaluate the proposed scheme in StegTalk [9], a proto-
typical covert communication system based on VoIP. Steg-
Talk supports typical coders, such as ITU-T G.711, G.723.1, 
G.729a, etc. In the tests, we typically choose G. 729a [14] as 
the codec of the cover speech. Similarly, we define the LSBs 
based on the observation that the parameters of fixed code-
book in G.729a have the best transparency for information 
hiding [9, 13]. Our tests focus on performance comparison 
between the traditional LSBs substitution method and the pro-
posed adaptive steganography method. Thus, we design five 
steganography modes as shown in TABLE I. The first two 
modes are based on the traditional LSBs substitution method, 
and the rest are based on the proposed adaptive steganography 
method. In what follows, we describe the results of the tests on 
a single phrase of speech and some audio samples. 
A. Test One 
 
Fig.3. Spectrograms contrast 
In the test, we compare the spectrograms of the cover 
speech without steganography and with steganography for 
each mode. We choose the phrase “It is nice to meet you” as 
the cover speech (denoted by P) and ISCAS 2009 CALL FOR 
PAPERS file (CFP15v.pdf) [15] as the secret message. After 
being encoded by G. 729a, P has 126 frames. TABLE II 
shows the lengths of the hidden secret message in each mode. 
Fig. 3 shows the spectrograms of the original speech and its 
steganographical versions with the secret message embedded 
in five different steganography modes respectively. From 
them, we can observe the following facts: (1) the spectrogram 
for Mode 2 shows the most visible differences from the origi-
nal spectrogram, indicating that Mode 2 has the worst transpa-
rency. However, it provides the largest embedding capacity; (2) 
the spectrogram for Mode 5 is exactly the same as the original 
spectrogram, because the embedding process does not change 
any bits. However, it provides the smallest embedding capaci-
ty; (3) the spectrograms for Mode 1, Mode 3 and Mode 4 
show relatively minor differences from the original spectro-
gram, which indicates that the speech quality degradations in 
these modes are negligible. Among them, Mode 4 offers the 
best transparency as it has fewer differences than the others 
but at the cost of embedding capacity. Mode 1 and Mode 3 
can provide nearly the equal transparency, but Mode 3 offers 
larger embedding capacity than mode 1 (about 1.43 times).  
Therefore, Mode 3 keeps the best balance between embedding 
transparency and capacity; and (4) based on an overall consid-
eration of transparency and capacity, the proposed adaptive 
steganography method provides better performance than the 
traditional LSB substitution method. 
TABLE II.  STEGANOGRAPHY CAPACITY AT EACH MODE 
Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 3 Mode 4 Mode 5
1008 bits 2016 bits 1444 bits 588 bits 128 bits
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B. Test Two 
To further compare the performances of the traditional 
LSBs substitution method and the proposed adaptive stegano-
graphy method, we collect 150 one-minute audio samples. 
These samples consist of three categories: male speech, fe-
male speech and piano music. All the samples are recorded 
with 8000 HZ sampling rate, 16 bits quantization and mono, 
and encoded by G. 729a before the embedding process. For 
each sample, we perform the steganography experiment in the 
above five modes respectively. The secret message (also 
choosing CFP15v.pdf, actually only some forward parts) can 
be successfully embedded and retrieved in any case. Further-
more, for the evaluation of the embedding transparency, we 
also carry out Mean Opinion Score (MOS) [16] experiments 
on all steganographical samples. MOS is a mapping of per-
ceived levels of distortion into the descriptive terms "excellent, 
good, fair, poor, unsatisfactory". Accordingly, MOS value is 
defined within the range of [1, 5]. Generally speaking, MOS 
value of speeches encoded by G. 729a is 4.0 [14]. 
 
Fig.4. Test results of embedding capacity  
 
Fig.5. Test results of embedding transparency 
Fig. 4 and Fig.5 show the statistical results of the mean 
length of the embedded secret messages and the mean MOS 
value for each category for all five modes. The data in the two 
charts further verify the conclusions drawn in Test one. In 
addition, we can observe that the quality degradations of the 
piano samples are more easily perceivable than the speech 
samples in the same steganography mode. This may attribute 
to the fact that piano music often has strong rhythms and ac-
cordingly its signal correlation is high, which makes changes 
more sensitive for the human audience. However, the sound 
quality of steganographical piano samples is still acceptable. 
Therefore, the adaptive steganography can be employed relia-
bly and effectively in the VoIP steganography system.   
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we proposed an adaptive steganography 
scheme for VoIP. The salient advantage of this scheme is that 
it can adaptively balance the embedding transparency and 
capacity. Moreover, experimental results demonstrate that our 
method outperforms the traditional LSBs substitution method. 
For further work, we will study the effect of both parameter n 
and parameter η. Furthermore, the impact of latency induced 
by the steganography scheme on real VoIP conversations will 
be investigated. 
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